501st Tactical Control Wing
US Air Force, Europe
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(Source: History of 501st Tactical Control Wing, 1 July 1957-31 December 1957, APO 65, US Air Force, 25 February 1958)

A. 501st Tactical Control Wing

B. Landstuhl

C. Officers in charge of Staff Sections

	Grade		Name (*)		Duty Title
	Colonel		Carl B. Lindstrand		Wing Commander
	Colonel		Hugh J. Nevins		Deputy Commander
	Lt Col		David G. Bearse		Director of Personnel
	Lt Col		Theodore K. Bower		Director of Materiel
	Lt Col		William F. Gilland		Wing Inspector
	Major		Samuel B. Levy		Executive Officer
	Lt Col		Andrew R. Schindler		Director of Operations
	Major		Marion L. Nelson		Wing Chaplain
	Major		Daniel L. O'Leary		Staff Judge Advocate
	Major		Ralph R. Bell		Adjutant
	1st Lt		Roy D. Green		Information Services Officer
	1st Lt		John J. McGrath		Comptroller
	Major		James M. Schuler		Wing Medical Superintendent

(*) AFSN of officers listed is included on source document but omitted from this transcript

D. Subordinate units and Installations

	601st Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Rothwesten, Germany	APO 171, US Air Force
	602nd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Giebelstadt, Germany	APO 321, US Air Force
	603rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Langerkopf, Germany	APO 12, US Air Force
	604th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Freising, Germany	APO 207, US Air Force
	615th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Pruem, Germany	APO 132, US Air Force
	616th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Ulm, Germany	APO 35, US Army
	619th Tactical Control Squadron, Birkenfeld, Germany	APO 34, US Army
	807th Tactical Control Squadron, Landstuhl, Germany	APO 65, US Air Force
	3rd Shoran Beacon Squadron, Bremerhaven, Germany
	6th Shoran Beacon Squadron, Landstuhl, Germany

	E. The mission of the 501st Tactical Control Wing, is contained in Twelfth Air Force Regulation 23-18, 21 October 1955.

TARGET DIRECTOR POST MISSIONS

	MONTH	MISSIONS SCHEDULED	ATTEMPTED	SUCCESSFUL
	July	233	126	113
	August	686	496	339
	September	591	360	245
	October	642	455	292
	November	676	446	300
	December	619	418	274
	TOTAL	3,447	2,501	1,563
	Previous TOTALS Jan thru Jun 1957	355	196	165

TACTICAL CONTROLLED MISSIONS (FAC)

	MONTH	MISSIONS SCHEDULED	ATTEMPTED	SUCCESSFUL
	July	100	51	48
	August	95	54	45
	September	27	13	10
	October	87	46	35
	November	74	45	30
	December	52	16	15
	TOTAL	435	225	183

Air Defense Branch

10288 tracks penetrated the ADIZ of which 10231 were identified by flight plan. The remaining 57 were identified by live interception. The following is a break down of ADIZ activity:

	MONTH	UNKNOWN TRACKS	ATTEMPTED INTERCEPTIONS	SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTIONS
	July	13	13	10
	August	10	10	9
	September	18	17	8
	October	6	6	6
	November	2	2	1
	December	8	8	8

AIR DEFENSE TRAINING MISSIONS

	MONTH	ATTEMPTED INTERCEPTIONS	SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTIONS
	July	2832	2480
	August	3605	3269
	September	2972	2486
	October	2659	2278
	November	2991	2564
	December	4049	3501

SAVES

Organizations of this command were responsible for 13 aircraft saves during this period. A "save" is defined as as an aircraft

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in one or more of the following conditions:

1. Lost with minimum fuel

2. Engine failure or malfunction

3. Declared emergency

An "emergency prevented" is defined as an aircraft in one or both of the following conditions:

1. Radio failure

2. Lost

As a result of the above action letters of appreciation from the Commanding Officer of the Tactical Control Wing were received by personnel of this command for outstanding action.

A brief resume of aircraft saves are given below:

	Date	Type of A/C	Difficulty
	5 July 1957	RF-84	Low on fuel
	10 July 1957	F-100D	Low on fuel
	15 July 1957	F-84F	Lost
	19 July 1957	C-119	Engine failure
	25 July 1957	F-100	Low on fuel
	29 July 1957	F-100	Compass out
	9 August 1957	F-86	Radio Out
	27 August 1957	T-33	Malfunctioning gyro
	2 September 1957	B-66	Low on fuel
	27 September 1957	T-33	Lost
	24 October 1957	B-57	Low on fuel
	12 November 1957	F-86	Lost
	21 November 1957	F-84F	Radio Out

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Air Movements Section

Due to an acute need for accurate and timely information concerning air movements penetrating the Air Defense Indentification Zone, an "Air Movements Information Section" at Munich (10) and at Frankfurt (11) were established by order of Twelfth Air Force.

Original planning was formulated at a meeting with the Bundesanstalt Fuer Flugsicherung in Frankfurt on 1 November. (12) At that time it was decided to commence AMIS operation at the earliest possible date and methods of operation.

The AMIS units were manned by US personnel from local resources as operating detachments, and became operational on 16 December 1957. (13)

(10) Twelfth Air Force Message 1200TDA 17116 dated 10 October 1957
(11) Twelfth Air Force Letter, Subj: "Manning of the Frankfurt and Munich Air Traffic Control Centers," date 9 November 1957
(12) Twelfth Air Force Letter, Subj: "Air Movements and Identifications."
(13) Tactical Control Wing Message DOACT 3405.dated 25 October 1957.

Headquarters TACTICAL CONTROL WING, PROVISIONAL United States Air Force APO 65, USAF

OACP MEMORANDUM FOR: THE COMMANDER SUBJECT: Tactical Control System Realignment PROPOSAL: 1. To implement a two sub-sector operational organization within the Twelfth Air Force Tactical Air Control system area of responsibility. FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROGRAM: 2. Facts: a. Experience in Tactical Air Control in this theatre indicates that a sub-sector operational organization is superior in efficiency to a single sector operation. b. Operational effectiveness of the present system is adversely affected to a degree, due to the complexity of a three sub-sector operational organization. c. Operational mission requirements dictate that the Twelfth Air Force Tactical Air Control System be organized to operate at the highest possible degree of proficiency. d. An efficient and well designed operational organization is necessary to insure adequate planning for integration of programmed and forthcoming equipments, i.e. Mink-Rafax, QRC-57 (Passive Detection Equipment) and TSQ-19. 3. Criteria: Any proposed concept of system realignment must: a. Be oriented to most effectively oppose the enemy threat. b. Have a peacetime posture aligned to wartime needs. c. Make the maximum use of existing equipment and radar coverage. d. Provide for the accurate gathering, transmission, processing and display of operational data. e. Provide for maximum offensive and defensive capabilities. f. Provide system capability with anti-aircraft artillery requirements. g. Provide system compatibility with programmed and forthcoming equipments. 4. Assumptions: a. The mission of the Commander, Tactical Control Wing, Provisional, as commander of the unit responsible for the Twelfth Air Force Tactical Air Control System, will remain the same. (TAB A) b. The 601st and 616th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadrons and their associated radar locations will be inactivated. Other radar locations within the system will not be re-sited to compensate for the resulting loss of radar overlap coverage. c. Surveillance procedure and control effectiveness can be improved with the adoption of a two sub-sector operational organization. d. If a back up capability is required, other than that provided by organic equipment, the necessary equipment will be made available to the Tactical Control Wing, Provisional. e. Headquarters, Twelfth Air Force will direct installation of Mink-Rafax, QRC-57 (Passive Detection System) and TSQ-19 into the Tactical Air Control System as such equipments become available. DISCUSSION: 5. Essentially, the proposal for a two sub-sector operational organization of the Tactical Air Control System (TACS) facilities within the Twelfth Air Force area of responsibility is based on a realization of the increasing need for the establishment of the best possible radar alignment in this theatre of operations. As a result of a process of constant analysis of the existing three sub-sector system, certain basic shortcomings of such a system have been discovered, analyzed and possible solutions devised. As a result of these efforts it has become apparent that basic changes in system alignment will provide a more effective systems, without loss of offensive and defensive capability. 6. Experience with the operation of a Tactical Air Control System in this area has clearly established the fact that a sub-sector operational organization is superior in efficiency to a single sector operation. During 1952 and 1953 the then existing control and reporting centers and control and reporting posts were assigned individual areas of air surveillance responsibility and were controlled separately by the Air Control Center. This type of organization generated the insurmountable problem of correlation and coordination of radar tracks among the six areas. In the final analysis, this system was operating one sector of radar responsibility devided into six semi-isolated sub-sectors. After a lengthy period of trial operation, it became evident that this "single sector" operation was inefficient and a new alignment was required. The alignment established was the present three sub-sector organization. 7. The three sub-sector system organization, inaugurated in the spring of 1955, has continued to this writing. Under this organization of three sub-sectors, the Tactical Air Control System divides the area of responsibility into three similarly arranged sub-sectors oriented on an East-West axis. The sub-sectors, Northern, Central and Southern, each consist of a Control and Reporting Center (CRC), a Control and Reporting Post (CRP) and Reporting Post (RP). The flow of radar data, moving east to West from RP to CRP to CRC, terminates in the Air Control Center (ACC). The ACC exercises control and supervision in operational matters over the three sub-sectors through the CRC's which are designated as sub-sector Operation Headquarters. 8. The operational organization described above consists of nine radar locations with three such locations assigned to each sub-sector. While this organization, since its inception and through its refinements, has proven far more effective than the former "one sector" system, continued analysis of the present system has shown that the basic complexity of three sub-sectors prevents maximum efficiency of operation. This efficiency block is most apparent within the area of cross-telling. Due to the geographical size and the number of tracks appearing within the system, the frequency of cross told tracks has tended to slow down the normal flow of air surveillance information within the system. In attempting to overcome this problem the feasability of an Air Surveillance Officer Conference circuit was investigated. (TAB B covers the findings of this investigation). While the value of the circuit was established, it was also evident that the circuit only provided a partial solution to the effects of the problem without affecting the crux of the situation which was, and remains, an overly complex sub-sector structure. 9. The need for the highest possible degree of system effectiveness and use of equipment and facilities dictates the proposed realignment. The strategic location of the area in which the Tactical Air Control System operates and the proximity of the enemy threat does not allow for less than maximum efficiency in system operation. In addition, the development of the most efficient alignment for a "manual system" will greatly increase the case of integration of semi-automatic radar systems and other electronic developments. Considering that a number of such new equipments will eventually be integrated into the Tactical Air Control System, it is necessary that system alignment and operation be such as to facilitate their incorporation to derive the greatest benefit from their designed mode of operation. 10. The proposed system realignment and reorganization could be as follows: a. The Twelfth Air Force area of responsibility would be divided into two sub-sectors by an East-West line passing through the present CRP "DORA"(Giebelstadt). b. The CRC "JOPLIN" (Tuerkheim) and the CRP "GUNPOST" (Rothwesten) would be deactivated. c. The Northern sub-sector would contain: the Schoenfeld CRC "BARBER", as Sector Operations Headquarters, the Giebelstadt CRP "DORA" as sub-sector CRP, reporting posts at Wasserkuppe "BIRDBRAIN" (RP/C)(*), and at Hof "LOUISIANA" (RP). The Southern sector would consist of the Langerkopf ("LOGROLL") CRC, as Sector Operations Headquarters, Freising CRP "RACECARD", with Regensburg "MERCURY" as RP. d. The data flow would be from RP to CRP to CRC to ACC, with associated operational control. Identification capabilities would be given the CRP's and conference identification and conference surveillance circuits would be established to net the CRC's and CRP's for cross correlation. e. Details of the proposal will be found in TAB C. (*) The designation RP/C (Reporting Post/Control) signifies that this surveillance station possesses a limited control capability as part of its normal mission. (See TAB D) 11. The proposed re-alignment is oriented to provide the best capability in opposition to the potential enemy threat. Oriented as it is on a EAST-WEST axis, with the early warning stations in the forward area and the primary control radars in the rear area, it follows the basic principles of detection and interception. Inasmuch as the Initial Minimum Line of Detection and the Minimum Lines of Interception (MLD and MLI) are located along the East/West German border and the German/Benelux - France borders respectively, the placement of the primary control facilities in the western part of the complex provides the optimum defensive capability in depth alignment. In addition, the workings of the system under this alignment, during peacetime, most closely parallel the system's wartime role. The best peacetime training for a wartime role is that which requires only a transition from the training objectives to the combat objectives without changes in tactics, techniques and procedures. The training concept and day to day operation under the proposed reorganization allows the above transition to be made without attendent changes in overall operation. An outbreak of hostilities would merely transform the Tactical Air Control System's combat potential to combat operation. Considering the wartime needs of the system (the defensive role and the support of air offensive missions) which constitute the primary facets of wartime operation, the location and vulnerability of control facilities are most important. Taking into account the lines of minimum detection and interception, it appears that the radar sites in the rear will, in a wartime situation, be responsible for the majority of the interceptions (the intercept problem is expanded in TAB E). The rear area sites have the best coverage of the critical area, are less vulnerable to enemy ground attack and have the most complete picture of the air activity. Therefore, these stations are better able to obtain the best utilization of resources and to take advantage of defense in depth than area the forward stations. 12. Under the proposed realignment the primary factor is the maximum utilization of equipment and radar coverage. In this area, the deactivation of two stations reduces the existing radar overlay pattern of the TACS without an appreciable loss of primary radar coverage. In addition, radars made surplus through this inactivation can be beneficially deployed to back up the primary radar, replace radar of lesser performance capability and augment the TACS control capability by the equitable distribution of control scopes to the remaining facilities. Finally, the integration of a limited GCI capability at one of the present RP's provides an additional defensive capability at a strategic location. (For a detailed outline of equipment reallocations refer to TAB C). 13. The basic consideration in any Tactical Air Control System is the accurate gathering, processing, transmission and display of operational data. Unless the raw data acquired through the radar is transferred into intelligence data and forwarded to a prime user a true "system" does not exist. The function of this process may be outlined as follows: a. Data Gathering: In order to present a consolidated air situation picture at the Air Control Center it is necessary to gather information from various strategically located radar installations. These units have the capability of detecting, tracking and evaluating airborne objects within the range of their respective radars. Speed, altitude, direction of movement and number of objects can be determined. In obtaining this information, the radar units of the Twelfth Air Force Tactical Air Control System are primarily concerned with surveillance to the East. b. Data Processing: One phase of processing track data is that procedure which eliminates unnecessary, low priority and duplicate track information. This procedure is necessary because of the low saturation point inherent in any manual telling system. This is accomplished at each echelon so that only pertinent data is displayed in the ACC for appropriate command action. In order to further eliminate the possibility of saturation at the ACC and to expedite Tactical action, track information obtained from associated control and reporting units (NATO radar locations in respect to the TACS under study) should be processed by the appropriate CRC prior to reaching the ACC. c. Data Transmission: sufficient flexible communications must be available to provide an accurate, timely flow of data throughout the system. Track progression is "told" from lower to higher echelons. Warning, overlap and corss-telling is accomplished by the transmission of track data to adjacent radar stations. To preclude saturating telling lines, separate surveillance circuits must be provided between the CRC's and the ACC. In areas where the track output is high, as in this theatre, a high degree of air surveillance coordination is mandatory. d. Data Display: In order for a commander to make immediate decisions regarding the conduct of the air battle, the ACC display must be timely, accurate and clear. Due to a lack of space and facilities for display, data must be processed and filtered prior to reaching the ACC. Because of the "built in" time lag inherent in any manual telling system, the receipt time of this data must be reduced to a minimum. The major problem of data flow within the Twelfth Air Force Tactical Air Control system is the processing time required from initial detection to display at the ACC. An important factor in this problem is the time which is presently expended in the cross-telling of tracks which cross through three sectors. With the elimination of this cross-telling time, more effort could be placed on the processing of other surveillance data, thereby accelerating the overall data flow. Considering this factor alone, the "single sector" organization, by eliminating all cross-telling, would appear to be the solution. However, experience has shown (reference par 6 above) that such is not the case due to required inter unit coordination. Under a two sub-sector system, the elimination of one sub-sector reduces this cross-telling time effort by the hypothetical factor of two. In addition, the two sub-sector system provides for processing surveillance data at the CRP's and CRC's prior to its arrival at the ACC. An important consideration is the direct relationship between a reduction of cross-tell requirements and the resultant acceleration in the overall processing of surveillance data. 14. As has been outlined above, the proposed organization makes maximum use of system defensive philosophy (TAB E develops the philosophy of defense as it applies to system alignment). The reallocation of radar equipments (Ref par 12 above and TAB C) increases the defensive and offensive capabilities of the remaining radar stations. This reallocation points up the necessity for all CRC's and CRP's within the system to be capable of performing both offensive and defensive missions. However, the preponderance of defensive activities would be concentrated at the rear locations. (TAB E contains a detailed statement of defensive capability utilization. Offensively speaking the role of a control system is directed towards providing control of aircraft over enemy held territory on offensive interdiction and/or close support missions in support of friendly ground troops. In both these activities the majority of activity would be handled by the Target Direction Posts (TDP's). However, the forward CRC's and/or CRP's will play an important part in "handing off" fighters and fighter bombers to the TDP's for final offensive control. Since these sites, being closer to the area of probable action, possess the low altitude coverage necessary for ground support operations they represent the logical choice for the major portion of offensive activities (See TAB for an evaluation of the proposed systems's offensive mission role). 15. The Army has AAA defense responsibilities for rear areas. In order for this defense to be realized it must be integrated with the AC&W defense. This can only be fully accomplished by coordination at a rear CRC which has a large area picture of the air activity. Only the rear CRC's will know when and whether the interceptors will hit a target because, under a no-alert situation, the interception will be completed near, or to the West of these sites. The AAOC must know for certain which of these tracks are assigned to them for destruction and have these tracks handed-off to its radar. This can be done most effectively by the rear CRC's since the AAA sites are in the same general location. In this area of Germany the AAA has only two groups and can furnish only two liaison teams, one for each group. The two rear CRC's with a picture of the entire air situation in the two sub-sector organization, are the only units with the capability of utilizing the TACS and the AAA defensive capabilities to the maximum. 16. The proposed system is compatible with programmed equipments. While a detailed discussion of the specific compatibilities is not possible in a short paragraph, certain factors are worthy of note. (See TAB G and TAB H for a detailed discussion of Mink-Rafax and QRC-57 system compatability. Mink-Rafax development was directed primarily towards the acceleration of radar data flow from RP to CRP and CRC. The filtering of non-essential information and the passing of only pertinent data to the ACC by the CRC represents not only the most effective method of system operation, but also the method of most effective Mink-Rafax utilization. In the case of the QRC-57, this equipment, which can detect electronic radiation from enemy bombing and navigational systems, should be located at the site with responsibility for committing interceptors. In addition, the QRC-57 should be located near AAA units since detecting too late for airborne action might still be in time for AAA action. Although information on integration of the TSQ-19 is not available at this writing, there is a strong indication that the design philosophy of this specialized equipment would produce better results under the simplicity of a two sub-sector system. CONCLUSIONS: 17. That the Tactical Air Control System be realigned on a two sub-sector basis. 18. That the Twelfth Air Force realign the Tactical Air Control System on a two sub-sector basis as outlined in TAC C of this study.

EDWIN L. MURRILL Lt Col, USAF Assistant Director of Operations

(Webmaster note: this concludes the part of the study that was included in the 501st TCW Command History for 1 July 1957 - 31 December 1957. Unfortunately, the TAB's referred to throughout the study were not part of the supporting documents that came along with the History.)

The reporting period opened with a whir of last minute preparations for a grand scale event. July 13th marked the second anniversary of the Tactical Control Wing, Provisional. Over a thousand men, who came from far flung outposts located from Bremerhaven to the Austrian Border, passed in review before Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, Deputy Commander of Twelfth Air Force and Colonel Thomas S. Bond, Jr. Commander, Tactical Control Wing, Provisional.

General Davis presented a safety plaque to Colonel Bond given by the National Safety Council in recognition of the wing's achievement in the reduction of vehicle accidents. Upon receiving the plaque Colonel Bond said, "This record was possible only through the cooperation from all members of the command."

Sharing the honors of the day, was the official announcement that Colonel Carl B. Lindstrand, Deputy Commander, would assume command of the wing upon departure of Colonel Bond. Colonel Lindstrand assumed the duties of wing commander on 18 August 1957. 1

The Adjutants function, as a whole, maintained the excellent degree of efficiency throughout the past six months even with the increase of work. A letter received from Headquarters United States Air Force in Europe in August requesting a reduction in

1. GO 13, Hq Tac Con Wg Prov, 5 Sep 57.

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number of command formal publications was immediately implemented. 2 Briefly this letter required each agency responsible for a formal publication to review each publication for elimination or supplementation. Emphasis was placed on 1) rescission, b) conversion to supplements and c) when rescission or supplementation was considered impossible, complete justification on Air Force Form 1382.

The net result of this program benefited was 92 command publications rescinded and 45 converted to supplements. Further savings were made by the elimination of 125 command forms by adopting higher headquarters forms. Consolidating two or more forms further eliminated 21 additional forms.

Tight money was a problem, as it was throughout the Air Force, for the first quarter of fiscal year 1958 (July, August and September 1957). Allocation requests were slashed by 50 percent which sharply curtailed travel in some areas of our operation, particularly in the administrative field. Rigid controls were put into effect and TPA was banned from the travel picture. The controls proved timely and we were able to carry on through the quarter, keeping within the funds liquidations.

The month of October saw our financial status become more stable and we were able to lift some of the restrictions that had been in effect since July. TPA was again authorized on a limited scale and once again our squadrons were able to step up

2. Ltr Hq USAFE, Reduction of Command Formal Publications, 12 August 1957.

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the carrying out of operational requirements. The major factor in helping us hold the money line and permit the continuance of operational commitments was the verbal cancellation by Headquarters Twelfth Air Force of all field type maneuvers. This had long been a costly item in our budget and the release from this type of commitment permitted us to channel funds into other travel areas that were short.

With the coming of December, a most important event occured in the form of the new Logistic Support Plan 1-57 for all USAF units in USAFE. This plan affected our organization to the extent that support of our units would be brought under the control of one of the four major support bases in Europe. The 7030th Support Group assumed support responsibilities for the wing effective 1 January 1958.

Additionally, a new requirement in the form of our annual budget was levied upon us under the provisions of this plan. As a result of this, we formulated our requirements in all areas and included them in a second revision of our FY 58 budget. This was a somewhat frustrating job as no back up data to work with in formulating our estimates was available. However, after many hours of diligent research, the completed revision was prepared for Headquarters USAFE. Significantly important in the revision was the further reduction of allocated funds for the travel areas from $251,000 down to $188,000.

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This reduction was made possible through the excellent cooperation of our commanders in realizing and adhering to the prinicpals of sound management and controlling funds in an era of short money.

Personnel wise, the wing has maintained a steady improvement administratively throughout the reporting period. The Twelfth Air Force Personnel Training and Utilization Audit reported that all units were equal or above the standards of other Twelfth Air Force units with the exception of two squadrons.

Generally, the manning in required Air Force Specialties has remained at a high level, and the wing was manned at 96 percent overall in required AFSCs, with an authorization of 4,024 airmen and an effective assignment strength of 3,886. There is one notable exception to the above manning picture which is AFSC 303K3A/73 Automatic Tracking Radar Maintenance Technician. The present and projected manning is at 68 percent in this specialty. Three separate requests 3 were made for assistance in this specialty from higher headquarters with none forthcoming. The USAF Personnel Priority Designator is 41 percent for USAFE in this career ladder at the "7" skill Level.

Overall officer manning picture had a noticeable increase, in that, the manning percentage of 67 percent to 90 percent from the preceding period to the present reporting period.

3. Msg, Hq Tac Con Wg, DPACA 3142, 20 Sep 57.

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This increase was mainly due to the authorization to man 100 percent and higher headquarters honoring and filling requisitions during this report. As of 30 June 1957 there was a total of 357 officers assigned against an authorization of 531. As of 31 December 1957 there was a total of 485 officers assigned against an authorization of 534.

Regular Air Force augmentation was received with 120 applications being processed for the 1956-1957 period. Of this number the Regular Officers Selected Board recommended 19 officers for appointment for a 16 percent of the total for the wing.

Maximum efforts were extended during the reporting period to increase participation in the Wing Recreation and Entertainment Programs. In this connection increased publicity was given to and transportation provided for international, USAFE and Wing sponsored athletic events. Allied-American events and exchange programs were conducted and promoted by this command.

The wing baseball team, 1956's defending champions of the Germany District, completed their 1957 season with a record of 13 wins and 13 losses. Although the TACONEERS did not gain championship honors their high caliber of play made them a constant threat throughout the season.

The Birkenfeld TACONEERS football team finished the 1957 Germany Conference Football League in 5th place with 4 wins,

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4 losses and 1 tie. Bobby Mitchell, an aggressive guard was given a berth on the USAFE all star team and Russell Rhanes of the backfield made honorable mention.

Freising Air Base was selected as the home of the 1957 wing basketball team. The wing team, USAFE defending champions, played out of Ulm Air Base in 1956. The TACONEERS had only two men returning from last year's championship team, however, the new players added to this year's roster make them a contender for the crown. As of this writing the team's record is 6 wins and 6 losses.

In July a Central Wing Isolated Unit Welfare Fund was established to administer non appropriated funds allocated to this command. Under the centralized system the wing fund is provided with funds and given the responsibility of control over their distribution and/or expenditure to subordinate units to support their morale and welfare programs and facilities. In addition Central Funds was given the prerogative of designating funds to the units in shares proportional to their needs as well as finance wing-wide programs such as athletic teams, wing magazine, commander's trophy and similar projects.

Ground accident cost for the last six months reflected a reduction of approximately 50 percent as compared to the previous reporting period. This represents a savings to the Air Force of approximtely $68,000, making the lowest accident cost for a six month period since the inception of the organization.

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This record is gratifying and indicates operational prudence in all safety areas.

Commanders and all personnel in a supervisory capacity were requested to take positive action to stress the accident trend in vehicle operation, both USAF and privately owned. This was accomplished in numerous letters prior to holidays, Command Conferences, Safety Personnel Conferences and especially at the Commander's Call Program.

Highlighting the events of this reporting period was the discontinuance of the provisional status and the redesignation as a numbered wing. After operating as a provisional wing for two years, this command had ample opportunity to determine the most suitable type of organization for the effective accomplishment of the USAFE Tactical Control mission. It was determined that a wing-squadron organization was the most desirable for this command. The direct control and supervision of the system which is provided by the wing-squadron structure would increase the operation effectiveness of the command. The current personnel authorizations were insufficient to support a wing-two-group structure without a decrease in mission capability. Besides this structure would create an unnecessary organizational pyramid and cause command breaks in an operational system which requires direct control. Complete control vested in one commander is an operational requirement.

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In November, Headquarters USAFE published General Order 83 which directed the following organizational changes effective 18 December 1957: a) Inactivation of Headquarters 526th Tactical Control Group; b) Redesignation of Headquarters 501st Tactical Control Group as the Headquarters 501st Tactical Control Wing; c) Assign the 604th ACWRON, 616th ACWRON and the 6th Shoran Beacon Squadron to the 501st Tactical Control Wing.

Modification of the AN/MPS-7 to AN/GPS-4 was completed during the past six months. This modification has greatly improved the early warning intelligence throughout the wing. Six AN/MSQ-1A radars were acquired by this wing during the past six months. These radars are replacements for the AN/MSQ-1 equipment which will be retained in a back-up status.

Three AN/MPS-16 radars, manufactured by the Crosley Corporation, were also received during the reported period. These radars will be utilized in a secondary height finder status by all squadrons. A total of twelve such radars are programmed for this wing.

Formalized on-the-job training on the maintenance of AN/TRC-35 and AN/TRC-36 radio equipment resulted in a smooth implementation of the new FM equipment into the tactical system. The effectiveness obtained in the maintenance of the FM equipment at peak performance is reflected by the eagerness of maintenance personnel to perform their assigned tasks.

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A staff study was submitted to Twelfth Air Force pointing out certain deficiencies in capabilities of the Tactical Control System to support their mission. In addition, specific recommendations pertaining to relocation of Target Directional Posts (TDP) were made. As a result, three TDPs were moved forward in order to increase delivery rate. Additional increases in delivery rate were realized by placing two MSQ radars at all forward sites. This doubling of radars also provided back-up to sustain control during "side step" operations.

Security for forward TDPs has been increased through meeting with Seventh United States Army and Northern Army Group (British). Ground forces will protect TDP sites against unfriendly internal forces. Also in line with security of sites, a (illegible) type defense wall was constructed around the 701st Tactical Missile Wing site at Reisenback (sic), Germany. This construction consists of two thicknesses of cinder blocks, interlaced with steel rods, inclosing one meter thickness of sand. The walls extend up to bottom of the MSQ radar antenna. Twelfth Air Force has requested necessary funds to build this defensive structure at all forward TDP sites for both the 501st Tactical Control Wing and the 701st Tactical Missile Wing.

There were 10,288 tracks penetrating the ADIZ of which 10,231 were identified by flight plan. The remaining 57 were identified by live interception. The following is a break down of ADIZ activity.

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	MONTH	UNKNOWN TRACKS	ATTEMPTED INTERCEPTIONS	SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTIONS
	July	13	13	10
	August	10	10	9
	September	18	17	8
	October	6	6	6
	November	2	2	1
	December	8	8	8

AIR DEFENSE TRAINING MISSIONS

	MONTH	ATTEMPTED INTERCEPTIONS	SUCCESSFUL INTERCEPTIONS
	July	2832	2480
	August	3605	3269
	September	2972	2486
	October	2659	2278
	November	2991	2564
	December	4049	3501

Organizations of this command were responsible for 13 aircraft saves during this period. A save is defined as an aircraft in one or more of the following conditions: 1) lost with minimum fuel; 2) Engine failure or malfunction; 3) declared emergency.

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As a result of the 13 aircraft saves, letters of appreciation from the Wing Commander were received by personnel of this command for their outstanding actions.

Due to an acute need for accurate and timely information concerning air movements penetrating the Air Defense Identification Zone, an "Air Movement Information Section" at Munich and at Frankfurt were established by order of Twelfth Air Force.

Original planning was formulated at a meeting with the Bundesanstalt Fuer Flugsicherung in Frankfurt on 1 November 1957. At that time it was decided to commence AMIS operation at the earliest possible date and methods of operation.

The AMIS units were manned by US personnel from local resources as operating detachments, and became operational on 16 December 1957.

The Escape and Evasion program which had begun successfully in the previous reporting period under the new concept of conducting a one-week ground school prior to a one-week exercise in the field, experienced a decided slump during this reporting period. All exercises scheduled by the various flying wings were cancelled per Twelfth Air Force Message on 2 August 1957 for the remainder of the year.

In August, the need for standardized method of reporting, identifying and plotting mass Soviet/Satellite activities became apparent. The Intelligence Branch developed a method whereby

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immediate notification of such activity would pass through a system, both through operational and intelligence channels. The procedure formulated was dispatched to the field.

Since implementation, this procedure has reduced considerably the time delay previously experienced in receiving such information at the Air Control Center and provided a method of visual display on the plotting boards.

The screening and extraction of information from the radar intelligence logs continued during the reporting period. By November, all useful information for the initial study had been extracted and placed in useable form. The total number of Soviet/Satellite aircraft as observed by radar of the wing had been broken down into monthly totals for the past three years. From these figures monthly and seasonal trends had been determined. The analysis had been further broken down into average daily track totals for each day of the week for each month for the past three years as well as daily percentages of weekly totals. It was interesting to note that the monthly patterns established for each year (1955 - 1957) closely conformed to one another. This formed a broad basis upon which estimates of further Soviet/Satellite air activity may be constructed.

During the past six months, 19 officers and 16 airmen from Mutual Alliance Pact countries were given on-the-job training at the wing AC&W sites. A breakdown of training given, and countries participating is as follows

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OFFICERS

	GCI Controller Course
	12 Greeks
	5 Norwegians
	1 German
	Ground Electronics
	1 German

AIRMEN

	AN/GPX-17 Radar Maintenance
	6 Danish
	3 Greeks
	AC&W Operator
	4 Germans
	Air Route & Approach Control Operator
	3 Germans

A definite increase in productive work from all facets of the Information Services was experienced during the past six months. This increase has been of such magnitude that it had placed a tremendous workload on the few personnel assigned. It was mainly attributed to higher goals and standards being

(PAGE 14)
established over the past reporting period.

Particularily significant in the public information field in regards to accomplishments was the inauguration of a television series dubbed "Eyes in the Sky." This series, a bi-monthly fifteen minute program aired over channel 20, of the Armed Forces Television station, Ramstein, Germany every other Thursday at 7 p.m.

The network, a UHF station, has the potential audience of approximately fifty thousand viewers. This includes Air Force, Army and American civlian employees of the Armed Forces and local German populace.

The series, a documentary of the Air Force in Action, was a 13-show package contract, spread over twenty-six weeks. This organization supplied most of the plots for the show. It usually revolved around life at a radar site, and the problems of every day life in the Air Force.

The show has received wide acclaim from the localities since the first showing. Since most of the material aired over the local television station is stateside network shows that are usually eight to twelve months old, a show with up to date facts and on the local scene had more appeal.

Along the same lines plans have been implemented to continue this type of public information program through the media of radio. Contacts have been made at the Armed Forces Network (AFN)

(PAGE 15)
Kaiserslautern, Germany for a weekly program of fifteen minutes, that will feature the 501st Tactical Control Wing. The program entitled "Eyes of NATO" will tell the listening audience our position in the big NATO picture.

The wing magazine, the TACONEER, has progressed with success. After only three issues, the magazine was the receipiant of a Certificate of Merit for Service Newspapers awarded by the Department of Defense. This certificate was received as an outstanding service magazine for the period of July through September 1957.

In the final analysis, from the viewpoint of an individual who has been sitting on the bank out of the main stream of the operation, the wing has finally come into its own. And with the new numerical designation, the 501st Tactical Control Wing has come of age and is ready to take its place alongside older and more experienced Air Force Wings.

(Source: Historical Data Record, Commander 501st Tactical Control Wing, 1 January 1958-30 June 1958, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 1959)

2. SUBORDINATE UNITS

	601st Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Rothwesten, Germany	APO 171, US Air Force
	602nd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Giebelstadt, Germany	APO 321, US Air Force
	603rd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Langerkopf, Germany	APO 12, US Air Force
	604th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Freising, Germany	APO 207, US Air Force
	615th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Pruem, Germany	APO 132, US Air Force
	616th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron, Ulm, Germany	APO 35, US Army
	619th Tactical Control Squadron, Birkenfeld, Germany	APO 34, US Army
	807th Tactical Control Squadron, Landstuhl, Germany	APO 65, US Air Force

3. MISSIONS

a. PRIMARY: Provide as directed a tactical control system through which the CINCUSAFE or SACEUR can exercise operational control of his offensive and defensive units in the Central European area. The tactical control system includes aircraft control and warning facilities, passive detection devices, and guidance units. Be responsible for training of personnel required to operate and maintain the tactical control system. Exercise command logistic and other support functions over assigned units. Provide a means for CINCUSAFE or SACEUR to a) exercise operational control of integrated AAA units; b) monitor and control offensive and defensive missions. Provide, operate and maintain adequate UHF/VHF DF facilities as directed by CINCUSAFE. Provide a means for disseminating air defense warning to appropriate units. Furnish intelligence information collected through electronic means to USAFE. Participate in special missions as directed by competent authority.


4. PERSONNEL (HQ 501st TCW)

	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
	OFFICERS Airmen Civilians Total	OFFICERS Airmen Civilians Total
	52 80 15 147	62 117 15 194

System realignment, effected by letter from United States Air Force - Europe, Advanced Operations (USAFE ADVON), 7 February 1958, was implemented 21 April 1958.

This system realignment, dubbed Operation "New Look," eliminated the three sub-sector system, compositing (sic) the network into one sector for USAFE's responsibility in the radar chain of the West.

"New Look" reduced the system to one sector bringing about a physical change in the layout of track production areas from a north, central and southern structure to a northeast, southeast and western structure.

Operation "Full Play," a combined Army-Air Force field maneuver, served as a test of the newly realigned system. Although some phases of the new system were inadequate, the efficiency of communications was vastly superior to that experienced in any previous large-scale exercise. This was attributed to the conversion from AN/TRC-1 and AN/TRC-8 to AN/TRC-24 point-to-point radio communications and a constant circuit monitoring system through outage reports submitted to this headquarters by the Air Control Center (ACC).

As a result of agreements made with the Military Air Advisory Group (MAAG) Bonn, Germany, during the past reporting period (19, 20 December 1957), assignment of German Air Force (GAF) personnel to the Tactical Control System commenced in February 1958. Initial increment was one officer and eight airmen for each of the Reporting Posts with fifteen additional personnel slated for assignment for the continuing next six months.

Because of difficulties encountered in acquiring security clearances for GAF personnel, the additional fifteen men input per month did not commence until 25 June 1958.

Immediately upon assignment an intensified on-the-job training program was conducted for the GAF personnel, utilizing the USAF OJT Package program.

Continuing integration discussions were held throughout the rest of the reporting period on day-to-day problems with USAFE, MAAG, 4th Allied Tactical Air Force and the Ministry of Defense, Federal Republic of Germany.

Aside from training integrating GAF personnel, the Wing trained fifty students under the Military Assistance Program within these six months. Courses conducted for airmen were Aircraft Control and Warning Operators, Ground Electronics, Radio and Radar Maintenance. The officers were schooled in AN/MSQ-1 Controller and Ground Intercept Controller.

New training policy established throughout the system was Electronic Warfare. Plans and schematic diagrams were furnished the squadrons for locally constructed ground-based jammers in the Electronic Countermeasure training program. As of the end of the reporting period, approximately fifty percent of the course outlined has been completed.

Air/ground communications came under study in January due to lack of sufficient communications channels that has been a limiting factor affecting the combat capability of the Ground Intercept controller. The study, forwarded to higher headquarters, recommended allocation of separate blocks of frequencies to offensive and defensive aircraft. Within these blocks, aircraft radios would be channelized with combinations of system common frequencies, area commons, and discrete squadron and wing commons. The ultimate goal recommended in the study would be to have 55 channels available to each radar site.

The prototype model of the AN/QRC-57 (Passive Detection Target Discrimination System) was delivered to the Wing in March 1958. It was the first of three units to be delivered. The control team which aided in the construction of the prototype at Rome Air Development Center reported with the equipment, but failure of the delivery of the maintenance van prevented complete installation. After numerous delays, Rome Air Development Center notified this headquarters that the van was enroute and would be delivered at the beginning of July 1958.

Formal analysis of the Soviet radar tracks observed by the Wing's radar stations from 1 January 1955 to 31 December 1957 was completed in January 1958. This analysis became the basis for an alert advisory service to the Combat Operations Center Duty Officer. This initial effort was manned by personnel of the Wing until 1 April 1958, when Combat Intelligence, COC, relieved the Wing of this responsibility.

Combat Intelligence continued this alert advisory service utilizing basic data given to them by the Wing. This intelligence service has contributed to an improved alert posture for USAFE in the 4th ATAF area.

The introduction of the AN/MPS-16 into the tactical system created a major problem in the technical orders and training literature and qualified personnel. This problem was solved through Contract Technical Services Program and technical orders obtained from the Crosley AVCO Division. Immediately, a school was established at Freising, Germany, where three classes of students completed the course in one month's duration.

This course warranted the availability of trained personnel on this equipment within our own resources. The services of General Electric and Bendix depots were used on a one time basis to alleviate ROCP (sp) conditions for four radars.

Unsatisfactory quality control on radar set AN/MPS-16 was reported to Rome AF Depot through Headquarters USAFE. This report listed the following deficiencies that should have been detected during the evaluation period in determining the Air Force concept of overall equipment maintenance ability.

a. Interior quality of welds.
b. Noisy blower motors.
c. Poor quality of oil seals.
d. Poor quality of bearing spacers.
e. High starting current required of motor generators.
f. Interior welds associated with drawers in equipment.
g. Inadequacy of Technical Orders.
h. Acceptance of equipment into the Air Force inventory without proper supply support.

This report recommended more critical quality control of material during manufacture and closer inspection of equipment previous to acceptance by the Air Force. It was the contention of this organization that inoperative radar time would have been kept to a minimum if proper exercise of initial quality control had been executed. The many discrepancies found in technical orders prompted the initiation of this unsatisfactory report.

The squadrons in the system were directed where possible to move all AN/TRC-32 type equipment from the TRC-32 vans into permanent buildings. The movement of this equipment simplified the replacement, repair and detection of troubles in the equipment because of the expanded work area. Patch panels and test jacks were installed so that controllers audio lines could be checked out or changed when necessary, at the equipment.

Set mobility had not been impaired, as the time required to replace it in vans was considerably less than that required to dismantle the prime radar equipment. Units possessing UHF/AG (?) equipment located at TDP's or Mobile CRC's were directed not to remove their equipment from the vans.

During the past six months, great emphasis was given to increasing the effectiveness of unit fire prevention and protection programs. The wing-wide fire prevention "Clean-Up" campaign highlighted the year's fire prevention activities. The three point "Clean-Up" campaign included: (1) the review by squadron commanders of the adequacy and effectiveness of established fire prevention and protection programs; (2) the proclaiming of the week 1-7 June as wing-wide "Clean-Up" week; and (3) the fire prevention inspection of all units of this Wing by representatives of this headquarters. The Wing fire incident records show that during FY-58 the Wing experienced one major fire with a monetary loss of $2,500 (615th AC & W Squadron Schoenfeld, 25 November 1957). This compares with four major fires and a total loss of $165,000 during FY-57.

Wing realignment, change in operational concepts and inactivation of the 3rd and 6th Shoran Beacon Squadrons resulted in many changes in the real estate requirements for this Wing.

The Wing Maintenance and Construction Project requirements were submitted to higher headquarters for review, approval and funding. The program submitted totaled $1,737,570 and was broken down as follows:

	FY-59 Maintenance and Repair Program	209,170
	FY-59 Major Repair and Rehabilitation Program	62,900
	FY-59 Minor Construction Program	157,500
	FY-59 Military Construction Program	1,308,000
		1,737,570

Projects funded during this reporting period totaled $452,795. The majority of the funded projects were for the installations of frequency converter systems. When installed, the converter system will permit 50 cycle commercial power to be utilized as the primary power source for all operational equipment, thus eliminating the need for costly, full time operation of diesel power generators.

The primary responsibility for the Installation Engineering support of units of this Wing was transferred from the numerous US Air Force and US Army organizations to the 7030th Support Group at Ramstein AB. The consolidation of the support responsibility greatly reduced the support difficulties throughout the Wing.

An interesting trend towards lower offense and incident rate prevailed in the first six months of 1958 and is described as follows:

	TYPE	NUMBER AND RATE PER 1000 1 Jan 57 - 30 Jun 57	NUMBER AND RATE PER 1000 1 Jan 58 - 30 Jun 58
	Offenses Serious incidents AWOL	598 11.5 17 0.32 29 0.55	233 4.8 8 0.15 6 0.15

An Organizational Task Force (OTF) surveyed four squadrons of the Wing early in this reporting period, and made functional reductions totaling 25 officers, 1 warrant officer, 301 airmen and 12 civilian spaces. There were six factors of this action which adversely affected the Wing: (1) the manpower authorizations in most functions were reduced far below minimum requirements; (2) some functions were completely eliminated; (3) personnel overages resulting from the reductions were reported for immediate reassignment; (4) functional ceilings were established which prevented realignment action; (5) the reductions were not applied wing-wide; and (6) reclamation action was prohibited.

After evaluation of these actions, the Commander decided that USAFE (ADVON) should be advised of the effects of these actions since the overall efficiency of the Wing would be seriously impaired. In a meeting with ADVON officials, it was decided that the following recommendations would be presented to USAFE Manpower and Organization Division: (1) the reductions be distributed equitably among all units without affecting the functional ceilings; and (2) reinstatement of the Comptroller, Inspector, Staff Judge Advocate and Office of Information Services function in the Wing Headquarters. Written justifications were prepared to support these recommendations. After presentation to USAFE Manpower and Organization Division, it was resolved that: (1) the reduction could be distributed equitably among all units without affecting the functional ceiling; (2) the Comptroller, Staff Judge Advocate and Office of Information Services function would be reinstated at absolute minimum authorization; and (3) the Inspection function would be authorized only one officer and one airman with the additional required spaces placed in appropriate functions.

The 1958 airman grade adjustment increased the seven-level authorzation by 403 spaces with a corresponding decrease in lower level authorizations. Previous grade adjustments had reduced the skill level of this command far below the yardstick for a predominantly technical command such as this, therefore, this grade increase was very beneficial. Although the total increase in seven-level was not needed in its entirety, there was a necessity for approximately eighty percent of the amount.

In May, Headquarters USAFE converted all detachments to operating locations and gave this wing authority to establish and discontinue operating locations. This action was very important to this Wing because:(1) the constantly changing operational concepts required a large number of unit moves; (2) each move required USAFE General Orders which often took months to publish; and (3) Operating Locations do not require General Orders and can be established by this Wing which would allow operational requirements to be met with greater ease.

Because all Tables of Organizations were rescinded in June 1958, the units of this command were required to be reorganized under an appropriate Organizational Table. A thorough examination of the published Organizational Tables revealed that there was no applicable document for the AC & W Squadrons. Therefore a proposed document included provisions which were general to all AC & W units in this Wing.

	Grade		Name		Duty Title
	Colonel		Carl B. Lindstrand		Wing Commander
	Colonel		Hugh J. Nevins		Deputy Commander
	Lt Col		William F. Gilland		Inspector General
	2nd Lt		John L. Miller		Comptroller
	Capt		Roy D. Green		Information Services Officer
	Capt		Vinson G. Cargile		Executive Officer
	Major		Marion L. Nelson		Wing Chaplain
	Major		Daniel L. O'Leary		Staff Judge Advocate
	Lt Col		Andrew R. Schindler		Director of Operations
	Lt Col		Theodore K. Bower		Director of Materiel
	Lt Col		David G. Bearse		Director of Personnel
	Major		Ralph R. Bell		Adjutant

(Source: Historical Data Record, Commander 501st Tactical Control Wing, 1 July 1958-31 December 1958, Ramstein Air Base, Germany)

(Source: History of 501st Tactical Control Wing, 1 July 1959-31 December 1959, APO 12, US Forces)

A. Defense & Systems Training Branch

During the period of this report, Air Defense experienced several changes which involved a regrouping of branch activities at Wing headquarters. This included the designation of three separate functions within the Air Defense Branch.

(a) Air Surveillance

(b) Control

(c) Systems Training

Major changes to the Control and Reporting System, brought about by USAF Ops Order 506-59 (Wet Mop) was the redesignation of unit air defense functions as shown below.

		FROM:		TO:
	OL 1 601 ACW Sq	CRP		RP		Wasserkuppe
	602 ACW Sq	CRC		CRP		Giebelstadt
	OL 1 602 ACW Sq	RP		RP		Hof
	603 ACW Sq	CRC		SOC/CRC		Langerkopf
	604 ACW Sq	CRC		CRP		Freising
	OL 1 604 AW Sq	RP		RP		Regensburg
	OL 7 604 ACW Sq	CRP		CP		(Tuerkheim)
	615 ACW Sq	CRP		CP		Schoenfeld
	807 Tac Con Sq	ACC		17 AF COC		Kindsbach
	(Op Site)

In addition to the changes in functions, there were two locations that have received, or are in the process of receiving, the modification to the GPS-4 radar that will, when complete, be known as the FPS-20. Another major change in the overall air defense picture, as a result of the change of functions for the units, is that all scramble action of interceptors will now be made from the SOC, Langerkopf.

For the period of this report, the Tactical Control System was credited with saving a total of six aircraft, shown by unit and A/C type as follows:

	604 ACW Sq	1 - F84F	25 Aug 59
	615 ACW Sq	1 - T33	6 Oct 59
	602 ACW Sq	1 - T33	22 Oct 59
	603 ACW Sq	1 - T33	9 Dec 59
	615 ACW Sq	2 - F100	10 Dec 59

From 1 July through 31 December 1959, Air Defense concentrated on modifying and standardizing directives to conform with the realignment and new equipment introduced into the Tactical Control System. New directives furnished the Air Defense operating units are as follows:

(a) Dash one tech orders on USAF and other NATO interceptor aircraft.

(b) Standardized Controller Information File.

(c) Regulations as follows:

	1.	30-13 Awards and Recognition for Units and Individuals Involved in Aircraft Control Activities		27 Nov 59
	2.	50-1 Rocketry Training at Wheelus and Brindisi		30 Aug 59
	3.	50-13 System Training Program
	4.	55-12 Directors Designators		4 Nov 59
	5.	55-15 Standardized Display and Care of Vertical Plotting and Status Boards		8 Oct 59
	6.	55-19 Standardized CIF/DIF Information File		9 Dec 59

Systems Training Branch. USAFE Manuals 51-2 and 51-6 were received and implemented. All weapons directors were classified according to skill qualification and operational status. Procedures were developed to distribute interceptor training resources evenly by unit and individual director. Procedures implemented to maintain individual records (updated monthly) for each USA and GAF director. Director proficiency training was adversely affected by lack of synthetic trainers; insufficient interceptor aircraft; unrealistic proficiency requirements and cumbersome reporting procedures. Recommendations have been made to simplify training and reporting directives.

B. Offense Branch

The major projects of the Offense section during this period were: (a) The TDP relocation project, (b) Exercise Side Step, c) Initiation of IFF integration in the tactical control system, (d) Integration of the radar maintenance amd MSQ controllers school at Bann Site, and (e) The completion of missile training for all MSQ directors.

(a) TDP Relocation: In order to provide increased target coverage and to remove TDPs from major target areas, plans were formulated to move Bann Site to Linderhofe, and Feldberg to Driedorf. Projected date was February 1960. The move called for realignment of the assignment of TDPs to squadrons, reassignment of personnel and the transfer of equipment. The Driedorf site and equipment was acquired from the 38th Tactcial Missile Wing. At present, the accepability of the Driedorf site is questionable due to coverage problems.

(b) Side Step: The 501 Tac Con Wg, contrary to original expectations, was called upon to provide a degree of operational control of its TDPs, with regard to mobility simulations and provision of supplies and personnel. A critique of the exercise was held to determine the wartime capability as indicated by the exercise results. Side Step will be reinstituted in the fall of 1960.

(c) IFF Integration: Offensive planning calls for elimination of the hand-off function of TDP/CRC's if IFF tests prove successful at the TDPs.

Operation Lu Anne was put into effect to evaluate the TDPs' ability to acquire their own missions and provide some mission surveillance with the AN/MPS-7. The exercise is still in effect pending the completion of 20 missions by each TDP involved. Under the test system, aircraft provide their own air-to-air clearance during missions.

(d) Radar and Controllers School: Due to the discontinuance of TDP functions at Bann Site, it was decided to consolidate the Radar Maintenance and MSQ Controllers School at that location. The maintenance school was formerly at Rothwesten. Five week classes were established to insure a steady input of MSQ trained controllers in the system. 38th Tactical Missile Wing controllers will also be trained at the Bann Site. The school is programmed to continue until such time as MSQ trained controllers may be pipelined directly from the ZI training command.

(e) Missile Training: In addition to providing a level bombing system, the TDPs of the 501st have been made responsible for the capacity of missile control. All assigned directors have been thru the missile training school at Alzey and can be utilized as missile controllers should the need arise.

In miscellaneous actions, Director OJT in the field was slightly revamped with the publication of the new 501st TCWR 50-14, which established higher qualification criteria. A quality control system was instituted whereby TDP mission success and equipment performance is closely monitored by means of a new reporting system (501st TCWR 55-4, Daily TDP Operations Summary Report). Reel-loading cable trucks were ordered for each TDP. The offense branch did not concur in this action.

Performance: Operating on a 24-hour alert-ready schedule and attempting an average of 195 missions per month, the nine TDPs of the Wing averaged a 94 percent success rate. The circular error probability for the period of this report averaged out to 1620 feet. The overall performance was entirely satisfactory.

C. Military Training Branch

Military Assistance Program Trainees in the 501st TCW during 1 July through 31 December 1959:

Courses Title: Aircraft Controller/GCI
Item #26401, Course # FAM-JT, Duration 7 Weeks

	NAME	COUNTRY		DATES	CONDUCTED BY		MAP PROJ #
	2nd Lt Jacobsen	Norway		6 Jul-21 Aug	615th		NOR 1-926-G
	2nd Lt Claussen	Norway		6 Jul-21 Aug	615th		NOR 1-926-G

Courses Title: MSQ-1A Director
Item #26404, Course # CG-OJT, Duration 4 Weeks

	NAME	COUNTRY		DATES	CONDUCTED BY		MAP PROJ #
	2nd Lt Haase	Germany		30 Aug-25 Sep	OL 2, 603rd		FRG 1-921-G

Initial planning and preparation of operations order, and active participation in Exercise Side Step was carried out during August and September 1959. The exercise, a NATO-wide Command Post Exercise, was conducted in a setting of D-2 to D-6 during the period 17-25 September 1959. Operation Order Number 105-59, 0001Z, 4 September 1959, was prepared by the Military Training Branch to task units of the 501st Tactical Control Wing. Direction of the exercise emanated from Operations and Training Division with coordination and assistance from the Materiel Directorate.

D. Tactical Evaluation Branch

The 501st Tactical Control Wing Tactical Evaluation Branch was established in September 1959 under the provisions of United States Air Forces in Europe Regulation 55-10, dated 2 March 1959, subject: Tactical Evaluation System and 501st Tactical Control Wing Supplement 1 to this regulation dated 15 May 1959.

The Tactical Evaluation Branch was placed in the Operations and Training Division under the Director of Operations, 501st Tactical Control Wing and manning was determined as follows: Chief, Tactical Evaluation Branch, Major, AFSC 1716; Operations Analysis Officer, Captain, AFSC 3034; Electronic Warfare Officer, Captain, AFSC 1575B; ECM Technician, T/Sergeant, AFSC 30370; Quality Control Officer, Captain, AFSC 1744; Tactical Evaluation Officer, Captain, AFSC 1744; and two clerk-typists, S/Sergeant, A/2C, AFSC 70250.

The Wing Tactical Evaluation Program was established for the purpose of providing standardization of policies and procedures within the Wing, to increase the professional proficiency of all operational personnel and to evaluate each unit's operational capability, effectiveness and efficiency.

The Tactical Evaluation Branch was given a four-fold mission to perform; to develop and implement a comprehensive Tactical Evaluation Program; to develop and implement a Wing Operational Analysis Program; to develop, implement and monitor a Wing-wide Radar Quality Control Program; and to monitor and control the existing Electronic Warfare Program.

During the Month of October 1959, the Tactical Evaluation Branch published a brochure which set the standards to be followed in all Tactical Evaluations of subordinate units. Written examinations for Directors, and Aircraft and Warning personnel were construced during the months of October and November 1959. These written examinations were designed using data from current operational directives.

The first complete unit evaluation was conducted at the 602nd Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron at Giebelstadt, Germany, during the final week of November 1959. The evaluation consisted of written examinations to determine the efficiency of the support sections - Communications and Radar Maintenance. Where problem areas existed, aid was given by the team members to help alleviate these areas, or, when these areas were not readily visible, they were called to the attention of concerned personnel. A unique facet of this evaluation was the introduction of Electronic Warfare into the intercept missions of the Directors. Reactions were favorable towards the utilization of jamming during the Director Evaluations.

During the months of November and December 1959, members of the Wing Tactical Evaluation Team, scattered throughout the units, evaluated Directors of the Wing who were eligible for skill level upgrading. By the end of the calendar year, 54, or all eligible directors within the units of the Wing, were evaluated for upgrading. This figure does not include evaluation of 25 directors during the Tactical Evaluation of 603 ACW Sq.

501 Tac Con Wg Supplement 1 to USAFE Regulation 55-10 was redone to reflect the new Wing Evaluation Program and all unit evaluations are scheduled throughout calendar year 1960.

The Operations Analysis Section of the Tactical Evaluation Branch published and sent to the field, 501st Tactical Control Wing 55-2, dated 11 December 1959, subject: Daily Operations Summary Report. This regulation sets forth the requirement whereby each unit within the Wing reports to this section the day-to-day operational accomplishments of the units. Also, the regulation improves the method of reporting the information contained in the Weekly Activities Report.

The Wing Quality Control Program is in its development stages. AFM 100-28, dated 1 May 1959, was received and is being used as the guideline for the program. The 7420th Support Flight prepared Radar Coverage Indicators for all units and initial data on Quality Control will be disseminated to the Squadrons of the Wing in February 1960.

The Wing Electronic Warfare Section was transferred from the Systems Evaluation Division to the Tactical Evaluation Branch in September 1959. The ECM and ECGM Program had been in effect for some time so no major changes or new policies were placed in effect during the latter half of the calendar year. However, 501 Tac Con Wg Regulation 50-9, dated 10 June 1959, subject: Electronic Warfare Training is being revised in order to place an unclassified Electronic Warfare Training regulation into the field. A regulation concerning the immediate direction-finding of interference to the Wing's radar units and Target Direction Posts by using the facilities of the QRC-57 is being written. Both regulations will be published and sent to the field by February 1960. Steps have been taken to declassify some portions of the Electronic Warfare Program to make these portions available to German Air Force personnel who are being trained at the Wing units. No progress has been made in this disclosure policy due to the amount of time necessary for higher headquarters to grant release of this material.